The complexity of the ever-changing information environment often makes it impossible to predict the extent of the immediate and distant consequences of an individual action, and the virtual nature of this action changes – at least subjectively – its moral status. In cyberspace, the subjectivity of the utilitarian approach is particularly acute. If this is so, the implementation of the “principle of maximum benefit”, which is the basis of utilitarianism, as a criterion of moral evaluation only gives very approximate and far from reliable results, which means that it cannot claim to be objective. It is even more difficult to remain impartial in determining which interests should be compromised. Nevertheless, as a rule, any action has both positive and negative consequences, many of which are impossible to predict (and even more impossible to assess) in advance. Therefore, as we know, utilitarian ethical theories focus on the practical feasibility of behaviour in terms of achieving the social good, considering the actions that bring the greatest benefit to the greatest number of people to be morally justified. the utilitarian and deontological ones – come up against great difficulties when applied to the analysis of the Internet communication. At the same time, the two most common principles in the construction of ethical argumentation – i.e. Therefore, web ethics needs a philosophical and theoretical justification using traditional ethical methodology, which should help it avoid subjectivity. However, as long as web ethics is seen only as one of the mechanisms of the Internet normative self-regulation, based on the spontaneously formed ethos of cyberspace, it will lack the critical scale to evaluate this behaviour, and hence change it on the basis of a real assessment. Its task is to serve as a tool for making decisions in morally difficult situations. Obviously web ethics must primarily be behavioural in nature.
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